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Abstract
This case study provides insight into how a particular transformation of the
innovation process affects individual companies and the regional Mechatronics
system as a whole in the Eindhoven-Venlo region (The Netherlands). The
transformation involves out-sourcing engineering activities by Océ, one of the
major high-tech companies in the region. Océ wanted to upgrade regional
suppliers from ‘jobbers’ into ‘main-suppliers’ so that most of the engineering
could be done by suppliers while Océ played the role of system integrator.
Local suppliers saw an opportunity to reduce the extent of (production) cost
competition by increasing their own innovative competences. Under the
Knowledge-intensive Industrial Clustering (KIC) policy programme the
collective goal is to build up internal knowledge resources and increase the use
of external knowledge resources in the local area. The case study shows that the
change in allocation between internal and external knowledge resources is not
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an easy (costless) change. The restructuring of a codification process requires
intensive communicative interaction between heterogeneous knowledge
resources and this is favoured by proximity.
1 Introduction
In 1994 Océ, a high-tech multinational making specialised copy mashines, and the regional
Innovation Centre initiated the Knowledge-intensive Industrial Clustering (KIC) programme. As
a joint public and private policy including Océ, regional suppliers, regional innovation support
organisations and governments, the KIC programme aims at localising and embedding Océ’s
codifying process into the region in order to take advantage of the externalities stemming from
this codifying process.  As a policy instrument it is designed to re-arrange the regional innovation
system by supporting regional suppliers to generate, absorb and cultivate technological
externalities that stem from Océ’s strategy to out-source engineering activities.  The R&D and
Purchasing units of Océ, the subsidising authorities and the regional suppliers all play a decisive
role in this transformation.
In the Eindhoven-Venlo region, approximately 40 firms are engaged in one or more of the 20
micro-clusters.  In a typical KIC project a multi-disciplinary micro-cluster of 3 to 4 suppliers
from the region work together, co-engineering a labmodel of a module into a manufacturable
one.  A typical KIC firm is a small or medium-sized skill-intensive firm, whose innovative
capacity traditionally consists of tacit knowledge accumulated by many years of internal learning
from experience.  Firms are in a variety of industries: metal processing, electronics, plastics
processing, glass, ceramic, software or plating.  Out-sourcing these engineering activities means
that firms are externalising a non-strategic part of their codifying process.
We claim in this case study that the change in allocation between internal and external
knowledge resources is not an easy (costless) change. The restructuring of a codification process
(internalising and externalising, integrating and dis-integrating) requires intensive
communicative interaction between heterogeneous knowledge resources. Proximity is helpful in
this respect. The KIC programme is a ‘learning to innovate programme’.  By ‘doing’, the firms
build up codifying and de-codifying capabilities, learn how to exchange tacit knowledge and
learn how to reorganise their internal innovation processes accordingly.  The collective goal is to
build up internal knowledge resources and increase the use of external knowledge resources in3
the local area.  In doing so the firms: “adapt to each other and influence each other towards
adoption” (Johanson & Mattson 1991: 257).
After discussing mechatronics in the Eindhoven Venlo region as the regional and sectoral
context, we will take a closer look at Océ and its out-sourcing strategy.  Based on secondary data
and twelve in-depth interviews, the changing innovation process of firms in the KIC programme
will also be analysed.
2 Mechatronics in the Eindhoven-Venlo region
The Eindhoven-Venlo region is, in many ways, the most flourishing manufacturing region in the
Netherlands.  Over 2,5 billion NLG (roughly one half of total Dutch spending on R&D) is spent
annually on R&D in the region.  This places the area next to Paris and Munchen/Neurenberg as
one of the most knowledge-intensive industrial areas in Europe.  Several sectoral clusters of
firms and institutes can be identified.  Taken together the core industry in the region can be
classified as Mechatronics.
Traditionally, trade, logistic and other services have always dominated the Netherlands economy,
in preference to manufacturing.  Eindhoven-Venlo has a high level of industrialisation by Dutch
standards: 29 percent of its labour force is in manufacturing, whereas the national average is only
18 percent.  The Dutch manufacturing industry as a whole is dominated by capital-intensive
process-industries like bulk chemicals and food industries, whereas Eindhoven-Venlo is more
specialised in industries like electronics, machinery and metals.  Everywhere in the Eindhoven
region one can sense the presence of Philips. In North Limburg, office machines dominate with
Océ in Venlo and Rank Xerox in Venray.
The strong de-industrialisation in The Netherlands during the 1970s and 80s had a negative
impact on the Eindhoven-Venlo region.  The region is therefore now supported by European
funds.2  Ten years ago the region faced serious decreases in employment in manufacturing
industries.  Big companies like Philips, DAF and NedCar cut back drastically in employment.
Although total regional employment between 1990 and 1994 increased 4 percent annually, this
was far below the national 12 percent.  In recent years, however, there has been a recovery, partly
due to a revival of manufacturing industries.
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Several recent studies (Meeus & Oerlemans, 1995; Louter & Smits, 1997; KPMG, 1996) using a
variety of indicators identify the Eindhoven-Venlo region as a one of high innovative capacity in
manufacturing, and also a region with a high level of internal coherence due to a concentration of
traded and untraded interdependencies.  By using an input-output methodology, indicating traded






·  Transport/value added logistics;
·  Environmental technology;
·  Medical technology;
·  Agribusiness.
Several of these clusters are strongly related and overlap; more than 20 percent of the firms
identified by NEI operate in more than one cluster.  Since mechatronics refers to the (early)
integration of electronic, mechanical and information technology, it links together the electronics,
office-machines, automotive and transport/value added logistics cluster (see figure 1).  Of the
400 most important firms and technological institutions in the region (together employing
57.000 people) more than half (with 43.000 employees) were in the ‘mechatronics cluster’.
The knowledge infrastructure is represented by 14 (public, public/private and private)
technological institutes that employ some 4.000 people.  This public/private knowledge
infrastructure is dominated by the Technical University Eindhoven and the higher vocational
training institutes in Eindhoven and Venlo.3  Some of the other technological institutes are TNO,
Innovation Centra and the Centre for Construction and Mechatronics.  The prime private basic
research labs are Philips’ Natlab (2000 employees) in Eindhoven and Océ (1200 employees) in
Venlo.  Together Philips’ and Océ’s R&D expenditure in the region comprises an estimated three
quarters of the total R&D expenditure in the region.
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[Insert here]
[Figure  1 Industrial knowledge-clusters in the Eindhoven-Venlo region]
Another way to identify clusters is by analysing patent citations indicating ‘pure’ knowledge
spillovers. Verspagen (1998: 21) has identified that “there are a very limited number of local
(i.e., Dutch) firms which benefit from Philips spillovers, or which ‘supply’ spillovers to Philips”.
The scientific network, however, seems to have some Dutch component, but the effect is still
relatively small.  Interviews informally indicate that the geographical pattern of these ‘pure’
knowledge spillovers to and from Océ resembles that of Philips, although Dutch Universities
(outside the region) seem to play a larger role in the scientific network of Océ than they do in that
of Philips.  Others (e.g. Oerlemans, 1996), have claimed the importance in the region of ‘im-
pure’ knowledge spillovers stemming from user-producer interaction in local innovative
networks.
Two main trends can be identified for the manufacturing industries in the Eindhoven-Venlo
region.  First, there is a shift from a mono-disciplinary to a multi-disciplinary creation and
application of knowledge.  Mechatronics is an important result of this trend.  The changing input-
output structure and the changing position of subcontractors due to vertical disintegration is the
second trend. Subcontractors have to transform from traditional ‘jobbers’ into ‘co-makers’ and
‘co-engineers’ by increasing their innovative capacity and organisational skills.  Both of these
trends are transforming the region as an innovation system, which can be illustrated by analysing
the KIC-programme at the core of both transformation processes.
3 Océ and its out-sourcing strategy
Océ operates in a science-based industry that is dominated by Japanese and American companies.
Out of the 18.000 employees world-wide, approximately 3.500 work in Venlo where the
headquarters, assembly and R&D are located.  Total R&D manpower is 1.500, mostly
concentrated in Venlo.
Océ was founded in 1877 in Venlo, and took its first steps in the copying business in 1920.  Océ
now supplies a wide range of products and services for the presentation, reproduction and
distribution of information on paper, like wide format copy machines for the engineering market.
With its first self-developed printers in 1986 and the introduction of its first fully digital6
copier/printers in 1994, Océ joined the Information Technology (IT) sector.  Within a short time
digitisation started to play a decisive role in all levels of the organisation.  Today electronics and
software have become the prime disciplines in Océ’s research and development (see figure 2).
Currently 40 percent of Océ’s sales relate to digital products, and this development is reflected by
the fact that the IT magazine ‘Datamation’ now ranks Océ amongst the world’s top 100 IT
businesses.
Although electronics and software have become the most important disciplines in Océ’s research
and development-unit, Océ’s internal codification process remains multi-disciplinary as the
creation of new technological knowledge concerns an ‘early’ integration of several technological
fields (see figure 2).  Moreover, 75 percent of the R&D budget is spent on multi-disciplinary
projects, using both internal and external knowledge resources in development and engineering,
whereas 25 percent is spent on mono-disciplinary, basic research.  R&D activities are vital to
Océ’s position in the high-end markets.  Over the last ten years the budget for R&D more than
doubled from 124 million NGL in 1987 to 305 million in 1997.  One of Océ’s most recent
inventions is a new colour copy technology.  Especially the early KIC projects are set up to
engineer systems or modules for this new colour copier.
[Insert here]
[Figure 2 Discipline ratio for Research and Development at Océ
 in number of employees, 1980-2000]
For Océ out-sourcing is not a recent phenomenon.  Océ is a ‘head-tail’ company, focused on
R&D, assembly and after-sales.  As a ‘system-integrator’, manufacturing or production
technology has never been Océ’s core technological competence; copying and printing
technology is.  Océ buys 90 percent of all parts and components, equal in value to 85 percent of
total sales, from other companies.  Besides out-sourcing manufacturing activities Océ now also
wants to out-source engineering.  This way Océ can remain focused on product development and
at the same time gain freedom in design and choice of technology.  Since “the integration of
resources [...] creates irreversibilities which may become obstacles to change” (Foray 1991: 397):
dis-integration reduces irreversibilities.  It may increase the range of technological choices
available to the out-sourcing firm.7
Océ’s out-sourcing strategy is based on the supposition that, in the long run, it is best (in terms of
cost, time, and quality) to let subcontractors do part of the engineering.  This trend has already
changed the entire automobile industry, and for several years now Océ has been applying this
concept to the Office Machines industry.  Before the Innovation Centre in Venlo persuaded Océ
to apply the KIC-concept, Océ applied a strategy called Early Supplier Involvement (ESI).  Océ
transformed its innovation process from a linear model towards a more interactive one where the
separate but complementary phases, from basic feasibility studies to market introduction, were
more or less integrated and overlapping each other.  Thus, the development phase started before
the basic research phase had ended and engineering started before the development of a labmodel
had ended.  This implied that suppliers be involved in engineering before they started to produce
components.
Historically, ‘jobbers’ were used to following strict orders.  Typical to the Fordist mode of
production and the linear approach to the innovation process, jobbers produced according to
detailed instructions, and they were not supposed to ‘think’ for themselves.  The exchange was
co-ordinated by the principals of ‘market’ and ‘hierarchy’, as Océ mainly communicated through
price and authority (Powell, 1990).  However, with the introduction of the ESI strategy, Océ had
started to involve suppliers in the engineering process in a one-on-one relationship.  With the
KIC programme Océ takes it a step further by sourcing most of the engineering out to a group of
co-operating suppliers in the region.
[Insert here]
[Figure 3 Origin of Océ’s purchases, geographical distribution,
in mln. NGL for 1988, 1993, 1996]
A few years ago Océ put a lot of pressure on their regional suppliers, threatening to go to East
European suppliers if they did not invest in human resources and develop innovative capabilities.
If the suppliers in the region did not succeed in upgrading their firms from ‘jobbers’ to ‘co-
makers’ Océ would turn to ‘global sourcing’ as the best alternative4. Suppliers from the region
seemed able to compete with more remote firms in Eastern Europe or the Far East (see figure3).
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Océ in fact discovered that working with East European subcontractors did not bring the success
they had expected. They had underestimated the transaction-costs and especially the ‘costs’ of
communication.  It was not the physical distance or transportation costs that made it difficult to
involve subcontractors into the innovation process, but the ‘costs’ of covering technological,
cultural and institutional distances.  Therefore, as far as the R&D department was concerned, out-
sourcing engineering to East European firms was not advantageous.  Interestingly, the purchasing
department thought that out-sourcing to the east was successful since the difficulties of the R&D
department in communicating knowledge and innovation are not quantified as ‘costs’, and are
not incorporated in the prices the purchasing department has to pay for.  This could explain why
the purchasing department is less enthusiastic about regional suppliers and the KIC-programme
than are people from R&D.
4 The KIC-programme
The KIC programme was established in 1994 as a public-private policy-instrument to promote
innovative clustering or networking among firms within the region by upgrading the innovative
capabilities of regional SME suppliers. From its inception, the KIC project has been an
influential example for many other cluster-policy-projects and at present the KIC-concept will be
integrated into Dutch cluster-policy (Roelandt et al., 1997; Ministerie voor Economische Zaken,
1999). By creating co-operative structures which promote interactive learning within the region,
SMEs get the opportunity to prove and improve their competence in co-development and
engineering, and to learn from other firms in the micro-clusters.5
The main idea originates from the regional Innovation Centre (IC) in Venlo (which more recently
goes by the name of Syntens).  The basic concept was based on a former experience with the
formation of a regional micro-cluster of three firms which successfully co-operated in
engineering.  The Innovation Centre wanted to use the experience from this pilot-project to
promote innovative linkages between the co-located small firms in the region, and at the same
time bridge the gap between the few very large and the many small firms.  One of the members
on the board of the IC in Venlo ‘happened’ to be the director of Océ’s R&D business-unit.  The
IC managed to persuade the R&D top management and the chairman of the board of directors to
join them in setting up the Knowledge-intensive Industrial Cluster-programme (Dirix, 1998).  In
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1995 several institutions officially signed the KIC agreement6.   The original KIC-budget was 71
million NGL for three years. The European Union, the Dutch ministry of economic affairs and
the provinces of Brabant and Limburg provided 24 million NGL.  The rest of the funds came
mostly from the participating firms (mainly Océ).
The idea was to form micro-clusters of a few firms, and to give them the opportunity to engineer
a lab-model of a new part or module for Océ’s new colour copier into a manufacturable one. Out
of the KIC-budget the KIC companies received a subsidy of 37.5 percent of their development
costs. The KIC clusters were organised in order to translate lab-models into products that could
be manufactured at costs considerably lower than Océ would otherwise have had to pay. Like the
Early Supplier Involvement strategy of Océ, the KIC programme is based on the advantages of
early collaboration in multi-disciplinary clusters. Besides engineering capabilities, this also
requires new organisational structures and communication skills which are vital for any firm
wishing to become a ‘main-supplier’.
During 1994 the first KIC clusters were established. In the beginning Océ identified the modules
to be developed by the clusters and IC consultants selected  the firms. Under the supervision of
the IC consultants the clusters started to co-engineer. Based on their experience in innovation
support to small and medium-sized companies in the region, the IC consultants knew potential
candidates.   Most of these firms had been located in the region for several decades.  As  an IC
manager of that time states: “We managed to persuade Océ of the competencies of these small
regional firms and they appeared to have technological and organisational capabilities that Océ
was not aware of.”
The organisational flexibility based on the informal character of the co-operation among the
small firms impressed the R&D unit of Océ.   As Océ became more and more convinced of the
concept (helped by the attraction of funds) it gradually took over the organising role of the IC.
At present, Océ not only identifies the modules to be developed by a cluster, but also selects and
approaches the firms.  According to the IC, “it is a sign of good public policy, when we can step
back after initiating a development so private actors can continue it.”  In 1996 the IC officially
withdrew from the program because of a disagreement with Océ.  Later, half of the public budget
was withdrawn, because the target of 100 micro-clusters had not been met and because KIC still
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involved only one ‘lead-firm’, while the involved governments had stressed the importance to let
other out-sourcing ‘lead-firms’ in.
5 Problems and progress
Although the IC did not leave the scene entirely (it supported several KIC firms with the regular
generic policy-tools for innovation in SMEs) some elements of the KIC project as a policy-tool
gradually received less attention.  More and more Océ selected firms it already knew, not
searching for less obvious ones.  This meant that fewer new communication channels between
Océ and  SME suppliers in the region were created.  More and more, KIC was used to strengthen
and up-grade the existing links with existing Océ suppliers.  Also, as several KIC firms have
stated, the teaching element originally proposed by the IC was never implemented.  The
involvement of professional engineering consultants in the clusters was meant to supply this
teaching-element, but these engineering bureaus were by-passed in the formation of the later
clusters.  Suppliers taught themselves how to acquire development and engineering skills, and
they taught themselves how to co-operate with each other simply by ‘doing’.  As most of the
interviewed firms have  stated they would not have liked to have it any other way, since they are
accustomed to learning-by-doing and moreover they seem to be doing it well.
Another problem concerned the lack of contract guarantees for KIC firms to actually produce the
modules that they had engineered.  In contrast to several other cluster-programmes which have
been initiated under the Stimulus Programme7, a KIC project ends when the engineering is
completed successfully and the drawings and proto-types are handed over to Océ.  Thus,
participating in a KIC project does not guarantee that the KIC companies will be contracted to
actually (mass-) produce the module they engineered.  This frustrated the KIC firms in some
clusters. Most firms, however, highly appreciate the learning effects, even if they do not get the
actual contract to produce the module.  Getting the production contract is not the main reason for
participating in the KIC scheme, rather the emphasis is on upgrading their innovative
capabilities.
A related issue concerns ownership of the created knowledge in KIC projects. Several
interviewed firms mentioned that all the codified knowledge resulting from a project officially
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belongs to Océ, e.g.  potential patents. However, as stated in the detailed KIC-handgide8 a
clustermember  may patent process-technologies, but Océ may not be excluded. Dealing with
intellectual property rights, however, does not seem to be a serious problem.  First of all, the
products are highly client-specific. The suppliers are actually not specialised in products but in
processes, and none of them supplies exclusively to the copy-machine industry.  Only one of the
interviewed firms suggested that they could use the product-design in serving another client.
Secondly, due to the small size of firms, they lack the power to resist potentially interested larger
firms, and, moreover there is a lack of scale to obtain a proper return on costly patenting
procedures.  Thirdly, the suppliers lack a patenting tradition.  They have a tradition to stock and
hide knowledge in a tacit form, accumulated in the skills and experience of their employees.
Although KIC has enhanced their codifying capabilities, most firms do not see the need of
patenting.
A problem of a different type concerned the exchange of CAD-data: the co-operating suppliers
used different CAD-systems.  Standardising on one system was not the answer since other
customers of the suppliers still used different systems.  Océ and Philips launched the ASCII-
project to tackle this problem, by increasing the compatibility between the different systems.
An additional complicating factor in finalising the (production) contracts with the clustering
firms was the fact that Océ had to delay the production start-up of their new colour copier due to
some problems with the totally new and leading edge technologies.  We can use this, however, to
illustrate one of the strengths of the KIC approach.  Had the KIC firms been heavily dependant
on contracts from Océ, the delay would have caused severe problems for them.  This refers to the
danger for suppliers of getting ‘locked-in’ to the technological trajectory of a client on whom
they depend heavily.  It also illustrates ‘the strength of weak ties’ (Granovetter, 1973), since none
of the KIC firms depends solely on contracts for this new colour copier, or Océ, or even the
office machine industry.  The KIC firms are specialised in process-technology and the material
they use.  They develop skills in mechatronic engineering and not in a specific product or
product-based sub-sector.  This is also typical of the dynamic strength of the Eindhoven-Venlo
region as a whole.  As the relatively  small regional-economic  impact of former troubles at
principal out-sourcing firms like DAF and Philips has shown, the regional production system has
a high internal flexibility.  Unlike the Fordist regime, or the hierarchical, pyramid shaped,
strongly interdependent supply structures the Japanese are so famous for, the supplier-base
survives if a core firm fails to do so.  So at different levels, whether within KIC firms, within
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KIC clusters or within the Mechatronics cluster in the region as a whole, the internal and external
economies of scope, ‘the strength of weak ties’ or Jacob’s-like externalities prevent firms from
being ‘locked-in’ to an irreversible dead-end trajectory induced by one of the core firms.  At the
same time these suppliers which serve several sectors (recall figure 1) fulfil an important role in
the ‘spill-overs’ between sectors, due to their relationships with ‘end-producers’ in several
sectors. The average origin of external knowledge as estimated by the interviewed KIC-firms
supports this, since 10 percent of the external knowledge used for product- and process-
innovations stems from the cluster and almost 40 percent stems from other sources in the region.
The KIC-programme can best be characterised as a learning and transformation process.  While
Océ originally stressed the need for suppliers to learn how to become ‘co-makers’ or ‘main-
suppliers’, it appears that Océ itself had -and still has- a lot to learn.  First of all, Océ’s R&D-unit
had to learn how to relate to suppliers as external sources of knowledge.  Both Océ’s R&D-unit
and the KIC firms refer to considerable progress that has been made since the KIC programme
was initiated, which will pay off in future projects.  On the other hand, both Océ’s purchasing
unit and most of the KIC firms are still not too enthusiastic about their relationship. Océ’s
purchasing unit wants to see ‘ex-post’ results in terms of low final production costs, and also
emphasises the need to externalise ‘chain-management’.  The purchasing unit also has a different
view on the opportunities in Eastern Europe and the importance of proximity in general, since,
according to the interviewed Purchasing Manager:  “the most complex modules come from
Japan”.  This reflects what may be referred to as Océ’s second organisational learning process.
Océ had to reorganise internally in order to co-ordinate the (‘forward and backward’)
externalisation of activities of both the R&D unit and the purchasing unit.  Recalling the ‘head-
tail’ character of Océ, we can place the communication problems  mentioned by the KIC-firms
and Océ (see figure 4).  Especially concerning  the early clusters, suppliers claimed to be ‘stuck
in the middle’ between Océ’s R&D department and the Purchasing-unit (sub-unit of the
Manufacturing and Logistics (M&L) department). In the first clusterprojects ‘R&D’ and
‘Purchasing’ communicated with the suppliers in separate meetings.  Later both Océ’s ‘head’ and
‘tail’ were represented in these meetings. Besides better communication and co-ordination
between the involved departments of Océ, an other solution to the problem of ‘integrating’
engineering and production concerns externalising the management of the supply-chain to several
‘main-suppliers’. Therefor, at present Océ is thinking of ‘training’ several KIC-firms in
becoming  ‘main-suppliers’. These suppliers may keep on co-engineering with their former  KIC-
partners, and when it comes down to mass-production they may organise the outsourcing
themselves,  i.e. taking the ‘cluster drawings and prototypes’ to East-Europe.13
In fact the decreasing number of participating firms per micro-cluster already indicates this trend
of externalising whole parts of the value-chain and leave the chain-management to one firm in
the KIC clusters.
[Insert here]
[Figure 4 The position of KIC-clusters in between Océ’s R&D-unit and assembly plant]
6 KIC firms and -clusters: transforming the innovation process
The KIC programme has evolved over its lifetime as structural difficulties with original
arrangements have come to light.  The role of the engineering consultants has been diminished,
and the (formal) size of the clusters has fallen.  Nonetheless, the original aim of increasing the
innovative capacity of supplying firms has improved dramatically.  This has been accompanied
by overall growth of those firms.  At the end of this section we introduce two firms to illustrate
this transformation process.
During a KIC project the KIC firms learn to learn.  They learn how to produce, use and
communicate knowledge.  The efficiency of the management of KIC as a policy-tool can be
questioned, but according to the impact observed by the KIC firms and Océ’s R&D-department,
it is a very effective policy-tool.  Whether initiating or speeding up the transformation process,
all the KIC companies agree that the KIC project helped to increase their innovative capabilities.
Besides the increase in internal competences, the firms learned how to combine their
improvements with the internal competences of their co-engineering partners.  In several cases
the KIC clusters used the ‘joint, new competence’ that was built up during their project for Océ
in other co-engineering projects. Most of the firms and clusters have not (yet) gotten a contract to
produce and supply the products they engineered for Océ, but they learned a lot in the process.
The codified knowledge output created in the projects is hardly of any use to the KIC firms or -
clusters in relation to other clients, and to a large extent Océ does not allow them to use it, stock
it, or sell it to non-clustermembers.  Thus, apart from process-technology, patenting is not an
option.  Neither is selling the drawings or the engineered products to other office machine
manufacturers.  Moreover, since participating in a KIC cluster does not guarantee a contract from14
Océ to supply the product, KIC does not refer to tradable interdependencies, nor to static
efficiency.  It refers to dynamic efficiency and collective learning capabilities which are based on
untradable interdependencies (Storper & Salais, 1997).  Furthermore, KIC does not refer to the
codified knowledge output, but to the creation of knowledge resources (Aoki, 1986; Håkansson,
1993) and the transformation of the codification process (Cowan & Foray, 1997).
As most KIC participants can be classified as former jobbers, they did not have much
engineering capability.  They were already able to read highly specified technical drawings, and
they knew how to translate them accurately into products.  Most of all they knew how to produce
them at low cost.  The drawings or specifications were never questioned, since their clients were
supposed to know best and ‘the client’s wish was the jobber’s command’.  In a KIC project these
firms had to improve the drawings that were made by Océ and they had to communicate the
functionality of the specifications with researchers from Océ.  This implied a big social and
cultural change.  As one manager put it: “Our people were not used to asking questions and they
were not keen on trying to convince people from Océ’s R&D lab they had a better solution.”
Likewise, people from Océ’s R&D-lab were not used to communicating with suppliers, and
according to some suppliers it took a while before they could imagine that a cluster of small
regional suppliers could come up with good designs or even better solutions.
Over the course of the KIC programme, the nature of clusters has evolved.  In total there are
approximately 40 KIC firms that have participated or still participate in one or two of the 20
micro-clusters.  In the early projects, clusters were formed by an average of 4 to 5 firms.  The
clusters have become smaller.  In these early clusters an engineering consultant was often one of
the participants.  Océ, however, did not want the consulting firms to take over leadership of the
clusters.  According to the interviewed R&D manager of Océ, the engineering consultants have
the same kind of scientific knowledge and codifying skills as engineers at Océ have: “It is the
kind of knowledge that looks perfect on paper, but we explicitly wanted to make use of the skills
of suppliers because it has been tested in practice and is built on years of experience”.
Despite the advantages of the loose, informal, flexible organisation among the co-operating firms
in the clusters, it became apparent that introducing some hierarchy and assigning one firm as the
consortium leader worked best. However it does not have to be a rigid hierarchical structure. As
two former KIC-partners explained their present relationship: “In some projects we asked them
to take the lead and in other projects we were the co-ordinators and took the final responsibility”.
It also emphasises again the idea of suppliers learning how to take over part of the supply chain
themselves in order to become a ‘main-supplier’ for Océ.15
After five years the KIC-programme has formally ended in 1998, but in 1999 the National
government will present a ‘follow-up’. In order to support the upgrading of other buyer-supplier
networks as well the KIC format is now being redesigned into a national policy-tool. At least one
former KIC-firm is expected to apply for this new policy-tool and take the lead in developing  a
supply-network itself.
In spite of the evolution in the nature of the clusters, the KIC firms have indeed undergone a
transformation. They have grown rapidly, typically more than doubling in employment.  Further,
they have grown from almost zero to an average of 6 percent of their labour force being
structurally engaged in R&D.
By introducing two of the interviewed firms we illustrate the transformation process:
‘Metal-X9 was founded in 1954. Within the metals sector, Metal-X specialised in aluminium and
fine-mechanics.  Over the last ten years Metal-X has grown from 90 to 210 employees.  The
present organisational structure show signs of the regional and sectoral embeddedness, as one
unit is specialised in making prototypes, one in fine-mechanical engineering, one in
mechatronics, and another in roller-technology (for copying and graphic industries).  In 1992 it
also acquired a majority ownership in a Romanian company so it could make use of the labour
cost differentials.
As a skill-based company most of Metal-X’s internal knowledge originates from learning-by-
doing.  Only recently has Metal-X begun to keep a record of R&D expenditures, largely to be
eligible for R&D subsidies.  Three employees are structurally engaged in activities that may be
labelled R&D, for several others it is not their permanent or main activity.  Metal-X’s internal
knowledge stems from years of experience in working with state of the art machinery.  As other
KIC firms have also mentioned, Metal-X stated: “We get more out of our machines than the
original manufacturers thought possible.”  ‘More’ refers most of all to ‘more precise’.  A clean-
room facility adds up to the accuracy that is needed to supply clients like Airbus (Aerospace),
ASML (chip-machinery) and Océ.  “The knowledge we build up is a matter of trial and error and
being alert, it’s not a purposeful activity and even if we wanted to the result is often very difficult
to patent.”  New engineers with a higher vocational training degree, handle the machines for half
a year before he is permitted to engage in engineering .  The tacit knowledge that is built up in
                                                
9 Anonymous, not authorized to use the firms name.16
employees through years of experience is vital to Metal-X.  This also explains why it invests a lot
in retaining employees e.g.  a full time job includes only four working days a week. Metal-X is
linked to the regional clusters of mechatronics, automotive, office machines and medical
technology.  It is also involved in two KIC clusters.
The KIC cluster with Glass-X, a specialist in glass , was one of the first KIC projects.  The
cluster had to solve a problem of attaching a glass cylinder to a metal-construction.  N-X and
Engineering-X also took part in the project, but they played minor roles.  The firms already knew
each other vaguely, but co-operation in the KIC project has created a more structural relationship.
Learning about each others’ capabilities has opened up opportunities for co-operation in other
projects.  According to Metal-X: “physical as well as cultural proximity made it much easier to
co-operate in engineering.   Our business culture fits nicely with that of Glass-X, but it took a
while before there was an ‘open’ communication with Océ’s R&D-unit.  In the second KIC
project the communication with Océ’s R&D-unit was much better”.  The relationship with Océ’s
purchasing department, however, has to be improved.  Despite the fact that Metal-X still does not
know if they will get the contract to supply Océ, the KIC projects have sped up the internal
transformation process.  It stimulated the firm to structure and expand its innovative capacity and
most of all it gave it the chance to learn to co-operate in engineering, which will be vital in the
future.
‘GlasX’ was founded in 1962 in a village near Eindhoven.  Ten years after its founding it
employed 5 and in 1985 employment was 75.  The firm split in two and at present there are 50
employees at GlassX.  It produces in small batches and the products are highly client-specific.
At present engineering has become an important activity, next to the actual production.  Before
participating in the KIC project the firm knew that it had to become knowledge intensive,
because it was neither able to compete on price nor to produce on a large scale.  With KIC it
learned how to co-operate in innovation with other firms and it has built up codifying
capabilities: “We had to make research- and test-reports and we had to provide sound arguments
for the engineering decisions we made.  Our people had to put this all on paper but they were not
used to it and lacked the skills to do it the way Océ expects us to do.  This is why there are now
many people working here who had worked for Philips once.  Some of them worked at the
Natlab [Philips basic R&D centre in Eindhoven] and they are perfectly able to write the kind of
reports we have to deliver with the requested drawings and products.”  GlassX also has contacts
with several private and public R&D-centres in the region but none of those contacts is formal.
“We know these people personally and we do not call them during day time, otherwise we would
have to pay large sums of money we can not afford.” GlassX is at present one of the famous KIC17
stories and next to Océ it serves a diverse set of well-known innovative companies like ASML,
Philips and Miele.
7 Summary and conclusions; Linking skill-based industries to science-based
industries within the region
While Océ can be labelled as science-based, the regionally based KIC companies represent skill-
intensive industries.  In multi-disciplinary Knowledge-intensive Industrial Clusters, firms use and
socialise their tacit knowledge, built up by years of ‘learning by doing’, in order jointly to
transform a prototype of a new product or module into a manufacturable one.  By out-sourcing
these engineering tasks, Océ externalises part of the codification process to the region.  This way
the externalities between the separated phases of the codification process are kept within the
region.  Moreover, these externalities are absorbed, accumulated and cultivated within the
regional supplying firms and micro-clusters of firms.  Especially the firms of the mechatronics
‘sector’ play an important role in socialising the technological externalities within the region, e.g.
by supplying to other clusters or core firms in the region like Philips, Stork, DAF, Rank Xerox or
ASML.  So, the Eindhoven-Venlo region is a multiple-core district.
This case shows that when innovation is concerned, internal and external resources are not as
perfectly substitutable as the transaction cost approach suggests.  Externalising part of the
codifying process by Océ’s R&D-unit to regional suppliers is not an easy ‘make or buy’ decision,
which can be executed over night, as evidenced by the difficulties encountered in the attempt to
turn to eastern Europe.  And neither is internalising for the suppliers.  Océ’s R&D-unit had to
create new organisational structures (internal and external) and communicative capabilities to co-
ordinate the complementarity of the development- and engineering process in another way.
Since, co-operation exists whenever there is a need to co-ordinate non-similar but closely-
complementary activities (Foray, 1991), Océ’s R&D-unit chose the ex ante co-ordination of co-
operation.  It could not be left to the ex post co-ordination of the market, solely communicated
through prise.  Océ’s R&D-unit had to experiment and invest in building stable technological
relationships with external resources.  Communication channels had to be created and ‘opened’.
Meanwhile, they did not shut down their internal engineering unit, so, some duplication still
exists.  The ‘cheap’ alternative in Eastern Europe did not work very well; the costs of
communication were too high.  So Océ decided to develop external resources in the proximity of
the region by ‘helping’ regional firms to build up an internal codification capacity in order to tap
into their already existing stock of tacit knowledge.18
Accordingly, the KIC firms internalised part of Océ’s codification process and had to invest in
creating internal codifying capabilities which were necessary to codify their tacit skills.  They
also learned how to communicate codified knowledge with Océ and how to use and
communicate their tacit skills with their cluster partners in order jointly to create codified
knowledge.  In short: both Océ and its co-engineering suppliers had to learn how to organise this
new ‘social’ division of labour, or actually this new division of the codification process.
Localisation in this case is a transformation and institutionalisation process: “institutionalisation
is a kind of ‘investment in forms’ that reduces the costs of future transactions, such
transformation costs might be conceptualized as sunk transaction costs” (Grabher & Stark 1997:
542).  KIC is a joint public/private policy aimed at embedding the externalities of the vertical
disintegrated innovation process into the region, by institutionalising and localising the links
between non-similar but complementary phases of the codifying process.
Summary
·  Océ wanted to change it supply relationships: either go to eastern Europe to reduce costs, out-
source engineering,  or both;
·  Suppliers wanted to reduce price competition;
·  Océ had already started the KIC process with its ESI, albeit in a one on one relationship;
·  Board member of the IC in Venlo was a director of Océ’s R&D department;
·  IC starts by being the co-ordinator, this role is taken over by Océ;
·  Problems: decreasing tendency to look for new firms to involve;
non-appearance of the teaching aspect;
conflicting CAD systems among firms;
lack of production promises;
communication between Océ’s R&D and Purchasing department;
intellectual property rights;
·  The micro-clusters have shrunk and no longer include an engineering consultant: Océ felt
they had little to offer and that firms had more to offer;
·  The clusters have become more hierarchical;
·  The KIC concept implies only loose dependence of the suppliers on the main firm;
·  The concept refers to dynamic efficiency by increasing innovative and communicative
capabilities of supplying firms, enhancing their role in socialising technological externalities
within the region.1920
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